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Professor Mooney, Judge Deady, and
the Celestial Kingdom
Anyone who heard Professor Mooney present his article on
Matthew Deady knows of Mooney's unusual success in combining
erudition with clarity, and close textual analysis with the develop-
ment of broad contextual themes. It was probably less obvious at
first hearing that this study of federal judge Deady, and his re-
sponses to anti-Chinese activity in the early years of Oregon's state-
hood, is pathbreaking in several respects. The chance to read
Mooney's study in its entirety and to reflect upon it confirms and
enhances my initial impression of Mooney's success in crafting a
significant contribution to legal history.
Nearly a century ago, Lord James Bryce observed in The Ameri-
can Commonwealth that "Western America is one of the most inter-
esting subjects of study the modern world has seen."' With his
characteristically acerbic touch, Bryce went on to note that in the
West, the "most American part of America," one could find distin-
guishing American features in "the strongest relief."2 These in-
cluded a tendency "to relapse into the oldest and most childish
forms of superstition," a willingness to allow the "majestic scale of
• . . nature" to be "wickedly squandered," 3 and a routine descent
into agitation and discrimination against the Chinese. According to
Bryce, this use of race to disguise class conflicts, this repeated ap-
peal to prejudice was immensely effective because "the masses are
impatient, accustomed to blame everything and everybody but
themselves for the slow approach of the millennium, ready to try
instant, even if perilous, remedies for a present evil."4
Bryce's insufferable elitism and outrageous racism helped virtu-
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ally to bury his insights and prophetic observations. We have long
ignored the very subjects that so intrigued Bryce. Indeed, we are
just beginning to take the legal history of the West seriously. If we
do glance West, we tend to see only California, which preoccupied
Bryce as well. Our legal historiography all but ignores the fate of
the Chinese and the agitation surrounding immigration during the
Gilded Age.5 Moreover, we know little about lower federal judges
in the late-nineteenth century, and virtually nothing about those be-
yond the Alleghenies.
With his study of Matthew Deady's long career on the federal
bench in Oregon, Mooney joins the ranks of Kermit Hall, Stephen
Presser, Rayman Solomon, and a small cadre of other scholars be-
ginning to explore the careers of forgotten notables who presided
over the lower federal courts in the decades after the Civil War.
Judges of that period dealt with new issues of expanded federal ju-
risdiction and with difficult questions about newfangled statutory
and constitutional protections for civil rights. Mooney has discov-
ered remarkably rich materials in Deady's responses to racism and
recrudescent states' rights. His study complements recent work by
Michael Les Benedict, Lawrence Friedman, Robert Gordon,
Charles McCurdy, William Nelson, and William Wiecek. These
scholars have forced us to rethink old generalizations about public
law in the Gilded Age. Their work, now supplemented by
Mooney's provocative study, suggests that it is no longer possible to
accept fully Grant Gilmore's wonderful generalization that "[t]he
few people . . . who have ever spent much time studying the judi-
cial product of the period have been appalled by what they found." 6
In delving into Deady's judicial responses to anti-Chinese legal
activity and mob agitation, Mooney finds in Deady "an outspoken
champion of immigrant Chinese rights and sensibilities"7 and
"strong, even startling evidence" that Deady abandoned his early,
rather extreme racism to become "a leading champion of private
tolerance and legal equality for all races."8 Mooney offers insightful
speculation about why someone like Deady would be moved to at-
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tempt to protect hated noncitizens.9
It is a pleasure to comment on Mooney's fine piece of work. I
also very much enjoyed finding clear and convincing evidence that
Oregonians miserably fail to live up to a reputation for being cool
toward outsiders. But having stood in the shadow of the University
of Oregon's Deady Hall, it surely also is my obligation to provide a
few additional suggestions and quibbles to repay the honor of being
invited to come trailing out to Oregon.
A complementary theme to those Mooney develops to explain
Deady's defense of the Democratic position on slavery during the
1850s, and to connect it somehow to Deady's aristocratic rejection
of mob agitation in the 1870s and 1880s, might be Deady's belief in
the obligation of government to protect fundamental rights. Over
and over again, Deady referred to a governmental obligation to pro-
tect basic, natural, or inherent rights.
The double problem, of course, is to determine what those rights
entail and to specify what a governmental duty to protect actually
means. Deady seldom found it necessary to say precisely. Rather,
he could adopt a paternalistic stance. This strategy worked won-
derfully-it allowed him to defer to democratic judgments most of
the time, but to arrogate to himself, as a judge, the final say any
time he thought intervention to be necessary. Deady's conveniently
vague belief in the obligation of protection may help explain his
noteworthy proclamations about the obligation of the federal gov-
ernment to provide protection when the states failed in their duties
to do so. Back in the 1850s, such a perspective could entail the duty
to protect property in slaves.
This leads me to a second possible unifying factor. Deady may
have been shocked, as were others of his time, by the consequences
of states' rights agitation; many considered this theory the specific
trigger for the dreadful carnage of the Civil War. When Deady ful-
minated against abolitionists in the 1850s, it was, after all, William
Lloyd Garrison, Wendell Phillips, and their allies who were sound-
ing a secessionist theme. But because it was Confederate faith in
states' rights that seemed to lead directly to war, the dangers of a
weak federal government surely could have a profound, albeit inef-
fable, effect when the Union was reconstructed. This may help ex-
plain Deady's otherwise startling comparison of states' rights
jurisdictional arguments, for example, to the shots fired on Fort
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Sumter, and his proclamation that state sovereignty claims were ef-
forts to make the fourteenth amendment a dead letter.
One of the strongest elements in Mooney's paper is his success in
capturing Deady's willingness to engage, from the bench, in the
rough and tumble of all kinds of political conflict. Deady's direct
involvement ranged from strident language about remaining faithful
to the post-Civil War amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion, to terrific, acrimonious debate over habeas corpus jurisdiction
with the neo-conservatives of the American Bar Association. In
cultivating journalistic proteges, making sure his opinions were
widely circulated, and presiding in cases in which his own sons were
the attorneys, Deady surely was not far above the battle. In pursu-
ing some of these aspects of Matthew Deady's colorful judicial per-
sona, Mooney has done well to capture elements of a salty, engaged,
and engaging personality.
It is always hard to move from the specifics of a judicial career to
the general, even when it is a long career that includes important
cases and challenges. One could emphasize Deady's response to the
threat he saw in the anti-Chinese "communistic mob" more and his
attachment to civil rights less than Mooney does. It is possible to
doubt Mooney's generalization about the judiciary as the least
blameworthy of government branches when it came to legitimizing
racism after the middle of the nineteenth century. The United
States Supreme Court and lower courts surely did a great deal to
emasculate the promise of the remarkable legislative period that fol-
lowed the Civil War. But Mooney's general interpretation of
Deady and his time is compelling; moreover, Mooney tells his story
with admirable depth and clarity.
What emerges is an important portrait of a judge directly in-
volved in the legal and political wars of a fascinating period. We
probably should only thank Mooney and hope for more. As an
Easterner somewhat awed by Oregon's rugged natural beauty, how-
ever, I feel I must ask what range Mooney has in mind when he
proclaims that he has discovered "the moral summit of Matthew
Deady's career." Surely, this is not the butte of some elaborate
joke, but I find it difficult to estimate the elevation of this summit on
a scale from molehills to the peaks out here where the air is rare. I
have no difficulty whatsoever, though, in placing Mooney and his
study of Judge Deady near the top of the heap of trailblazers push-
ing onward and upward toward a better understanding of a vital
period in American legal history.
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